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the presence of competing group interests."Jo 
What this book could and should have been is a serious exami-
nation of the role played by the various conservative organizations 
currently part of today's legal scene. Are they simply covers for 
business organizations? Do some of them simply echo the positions 
taken by law enforcement officials? Are there groups that truly rep-
resent individuals who otherwise have no representation, the crite-
rion that those of us in the liberal public interest movement believe 
describes the proper role of the public interest lawyer? Who exactly 
are these conservative groups, what are they doing, how effective 
are they, and what would be lost to the system if not another penny 
went to support them? Where do judicial activism and restraint fit 
into long-term conservative strategy? I do not know the answers to 
many of these questions, but I do know that I cannot find them in 
Conservatives in Court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: ASPECfS OF THE 
BILL OF RIGHTS. By Leonard W. Levy.1 Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 1986. Pp. 272. $29.95. 
Donald 0. Deweyz 
When a historian's second volume of essays is published, you 
know he is both prolific and influential. If that historian is Leonard 
Levy, you also know the essays will be trenchant, controversial, and 
often witty. 
This selection of twelve essays concentrates primarily on first 
and fifth amendment freedoms-especially those concerning speech, 
press and religion and the freedom against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. Most of the essays come from the 1980's, though one was 
printed as early as 1961 and another in 1962. Two have never 
10. In several places Epstein tries to draw a distinction between conservative groups 
and their liberal counterparts by statements, such as the following, that set up contrasts that 
are meaningless to me: "Its founders believed that the [Pacific Legal Foundation] would 
handle legal issues rather than advocate specific causes arising in California and dealing with 
the environment, in particular" (p. 121). See also (or perhaps compare) at 122-23: the PLF 
"has not attempted to bring test cases to court. Rather, PLF attorneys 'have been involved in 
systematic [litigation] campaigns ... from the other side' ... by putting liberal groups on the 
defensive." (The example cited is an amicus brief supporting the Navy.) See also discussion 
on page 50 contrasting the strategy of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and 
the Right to Work Legal Defense Fund and the discussions of various strategies on page 132. 
I. Andrew W. Mellon All Claremont Professor of Humanities and Chairman of the 
Graduate Faculty of History at Claremont Graduate School. 
2. Professor of History and Dean of Natural and Social Sciences at California State 
University, Los Angeles. 
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before been printed.3 
The essays which are not already available elsewhere merit first 
consideration in a review. "Constitutional History, 1776-1789" is a 
fairly straightforward account, as an encyclopedia entry probably 
should be, of the Constitution-building era. It emphasizes national-
ism and centralism in 1776, in the Virginia Plan and even in the 
New Jersey Plan. While many stress the compromises of the federal 
convention, Levy is more impressed by an overwhelming consensus. 
Such crucial provisions as the taxing, necessary and proper, and 
supremacy clauses were, for instance, accepted unanimously by the 
states. Considering our level of certainty regarding events in the 
federal convention, he might better have added the words "so far as 
can be determined from records of the convention." Levy rejects 
the economic emphasis of Charles A. Beard and his followers, and 
finds the Constitution extraordinarily democratic for its time.4 
Levy jumps on Chief Justice Burger with both feet-and his 
spikes high-in the other essay that has not been published previ-
ously. The first sentence of "Subversion of Miranda" describes Bur-
ger's majority opinion in Harris v. New Yorks as "one of the most 
scandalous, extraordinary, and inexplicable in the history of the 
Court." Even that extraordinary sentence falls short of setting the 
tone of anger that is to follow. Phrases such as "shocking distor-
tion," "verbal trickery," "flagrant misuse," "his own lies," "odious 
doctrine," "elephantine misrepresentations and mangling of prece-
dents," and "incompetence" abound in his description of Harris. 
The article can best be summed up in these angry lines: " 'Mon-
strous' was the right word to describe the fundamentally immoral 
opinion by Burger. It was based on deceit and distortion." 
Since Chief Justice Burger is obviously not one of Levy's he-
roes, it is no surprise that Burger is likewise the "heavy" of "Judi-
cial Activism and Strict Construction," an essay which contrasts 
the Warren and Burger Courts' handling of criminal justice opin-
ions. Levy asserts that the Nixon appointees have engaged in stump 
speeches that have "elevated the lapse and the gaffe to familiar 
events on decision day." Playing with a quote from the eminently 
quotable Oliver Wendell Holmes, Levy asserts that the Burger rna-
3. One of these will be in the bicentennial Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 
which he is editing and which is scheduled for publication soon. 
4. One hopes that before the encyclopedia goes to press he will have corrected the 
impression he gives that it was "unanimous consent for amendments" of the Articles of Con-
federation which made it possible for Maryland to hold out for a national domain. A careful 
rereading demonstrates that Levy was not factually incorrect, but hopefully he will revise the 
sentence so that even the less careful reader, as I evidently was the first two times, will not be 
misled. 
5. 401 u.s. 222 (1971). 
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jority are "no damn good as judges." He scoffs at the "foolish or 
deceptive" belief that Nixon appointed strict interpreters of the 
Constitution. That they are conservative activists is taken for 
granted now, but it was not so obvious in 1974 when Levy first 
published this article. Indeed, Levy regards strict constructionism 
as a "faintly ridiculous usage" in light of the imprecision of the 
Constitution itself. 
Earl Warren, on the other hand, was an activist in order to 
transmit a "better Bill of Rights." Levy is not convinced that deci-
sions of the Warren Court have had significant impact on the na-
tion's crime wave, despite frequent attacks on the Court for the 
procedural safeguards which it has provided to suspects. Nor could 
Nixon have prevented a crime wave even if he had written all the 
decisions himself. 
"The Bill of Rights," from a provocative 1984 encyclopedia 
entry, manages to make everyone who had argued for--or 
against-a Bill of Rights look misguided and somewhat dishonora-
ble. This remark sums up the tone of political expediency accompa-
nying the struggle for amendments: "Our precious Bill of Rights 
. . . resulted from the reluctant necessity of certain Federalists to 
capitalize on a cause that had been originated, in vain, by the Anti-
Federalists for ulterior purposes. The party that had first opposed 
the Bill of Rights inadvertently wound up with the responsibility for 
its framing and ratification, while the party that had at first profess-
edly wanted it discovered too late that it not only was embarrassing 
but disastrous for those ulterior purposes." 
He is especially hard on the specious arguments used by the 
Federalists to justify their failure to provide the protections which 
were demanded. The perennial argument that to protect some 
rights would imply that all rights that were omitted would be 
thereby sacrificed is rejected out-of-hand. If this point were valid, 
then the framers themselves had already committed that atrocity by 
including the ex post facto, attainder and treason clauses within the 
Constitution itself. Their argument that a Bill of Rights was "un-
American" or applicable only to monarchies was, to Levy, a blun-
der and "botching" of constitutional theory. Yet elsewhere he indi-
cates that the record of state governments had already 
demonstrated the inadequacies of bills of rights as a protection of 
essential freedoms. He highlights the inadequacies of the highly-
touted Virginia Declaration of Rights, which we so often regard as 
the blueprint for the United States Bill of Rights. 
Levy attempts to distinguish between natural rights and 
"rights modified by society," the latter being "means for the protec-
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tion of natural rights." It must be said, however, that the distinc-
tion fades away during his lengthy list of borrowings from the 
various state constitutions. 
"Freedom of Speech in Seventeenth-Century Thought," first 
published a quarter-century ago, highlights one of Levy's recurrent 
themes: freedom of expression was grossly limited both in Europe 
and America prior to the first amendment. Under the doctrine of 
seditious libel the state could and did punish its critics. Locke, 
Milton and Spinoza, for example, never questioned the state's abil-
ity to put down seditious libel. 
"Liberty and the First Amendment, 1790-1800" welcomes Re-
publican reaction to the Sedition Act of 1798 as a "new promontory 
of libertarian thought jutting out of a stagnant Blackstonian sea." 
Republicans argued then-though not always later after the "good 
guys" had prevailed in the election of 1800-for an extensive free-
dom of the press. Until then freedom of the press had been limited 
to the prevention of prior suppression. 
The (sometime) freedom of press is also the issue in "Did the 
Zenger Case Really Matter? Freedom of the Press in Colonial New 
York." Discussions of the trial of John Peter Zenger have given a 
false impression that free speech applied even to unpopular views in 
eighteenth century America. On the contrary, Levy argues, Zenger 
was "tried by a jury and acquitted because he symbolized a popular 
cause." Had the journal for which he was a lowly printer attacked 
the legislature rather than a despised royal governor, the outcome 
would have been quite different. The legislative manhandling of Al-
exander McDougall in the same state thirty-four years later justified 
Levy's comment that "no cause was more honored by rhetorical 
declamation and dishonored in practice than that of freedom of ex-
pression during the revolutionary period." 
"Jefferson As a Civil Libertarian" is a reminder of the vigor 
with which Levy trampled on Thomas Jefferson's reputation in his 
iconoclastic book, Jefferson and Civil Liberties.6 Jefferson wrote so 
beautifully and inspiringly about liberty that, when his actions be-
lied his writings, historians and other Americans wanted to look the 
other way and assume that there must be some mistake; as Levy put 
it, "his pen was mightier than his practice." Jefferson was also a 
"thin-skinned, fierce political partisan," who found it very difficult 
to admit that he ever erred. Where others cite with embarrassment 
Jeffersonian "lapses" such as the Josiah Philips attainder, the high-
handed implementation of the Embargo, the heartless treatment of 
6. L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963). 
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Aaron Burr, and his views of slavery, Levy does so with glee. Levy 
argues that "the notion of Jefferson's perfection as a libertarian 
must be relinquished if he is to be kept as a model of values to 
which we aspire as a nation. The only worthy Jefferson must also 
be finite." In Levy's grasp, Jefferson becomes infinitely finite! 
He characterizes Jefferson as a great popularizer who bril-
liantly restated popular principles but who made no significant 
breakthrough in liberal thought. The one issue on which Levy finds 
Jefferson philosophically sound and consistent is that of religious 
freedom. 
The argument of "History and Judicial History: The Case of 
the Fifth Amendment" is the "notorious fact" that "The Supreme 
Court has flunked history." The Court, as usual with lawyers, uses 
its facts for advocacy more than to seek historical truth. Levy ar-
gues that history has been misused by both sides on the issue of self-
incrimination. He finds Miranda v. Arizona 7 "beyond all precedent, 
yet not beyond its historical spirit"; Miranda warnings (as distinct 
from the decision itself) were, however, "an invention of the Court, 
devoid of historical support." The warnings converted the right of 
counsel from a fighting right which offered no protection unless it 
was specifically invoked, to a "pampered" right. He argues that, 
despite the basic-and early-significance of the concept of self-in-
crimination, history does not "exalt the right against the claims of 
justice." 
"The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause" is obvi-
ously one of Levy's favorites, since this is its third appearance (at 
least) in a book of essays. He dredges up every conceivable histori-
cal source to demonstrate that Madison and his contemporaries in-
tended to prevent an establishment of religion Gust what the clause 
says) rather than merely to prevent the establishment by Congress 
of a single official church. 
"John Lilburne and the Rights of Englishmen" is an exciting 
tale of the seventeenth century Leveller's success in intimidating 
courts to the point where the right against self-incrimination was 
established almost out of self-defense. "Quaker, Blasphemy and 
Toleration" is another largely biographical essay which vividly de-
scribes George Fox and James Naylor's unceasing conflicts with the 
British government. 
Seven of the twelve essays are accompanied by extensive foot-
notes. The text would have profited from more careful proofread-
7. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
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ing, but fortunately the errors are minor ones that do not confuse 
Levy's line of argument. 
NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT. By Donald Alexander 
Downs. 1 Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 1985. Pp. xii, 227. $20.00. 
John H Garvey2 
There have only been two significant events in the life of the 
group libel doctrine: the 1952 decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois 
and the litigation arising out of the Nazis' attempt to march in Sko-
kie, Illinois in 1977. We are now accustomed to think of Beauhar-
nais as a derelict, cast off by the Supreme Court in New York Times 
v. Sullivan. This book argues that it would be unwise to abandon 
the concept of group libel, and that a properly limited rule against 
racial vilification would forbid expression such as the Nazi march. 
The Nazis (thirty to fifty of them) wanted to march up and 
down for half an hour in front of the Skokie Village Hall on a Sun-
day afternoon, to protest an ordinance requiring demonstrators to 
carry insurance. They said they would carry signs with catchy slo-
gans like "White Free Speech" and, more to the point, they would 
wear storm-trooper uniforms with swastika armbands. Most of 
Skokie's residents are Jewish, and many are survivors of persecution 
by Hitler's regime. The Nazis stirred things up in advance with 
some vile leaflets announcing their coming. Frank Collin, their 
leader, told Professor Downs that 
I used it [the first amendment] at Skokie. I planned the reaction of the Jews. They 
[were] hysterical. 
The Village sued in a state court to enjoin the march on the 
theory that it would cause distress to the Jewish population, incite 
religious hatred, and provoke violent retaliation. This ultimately 
failed.3 The Village also enacted three ordinances to provide more 
I. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
2. Wendell Cherry Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. 
3. In the Cook County circuit court the Village got an injunction that forbade the 
Nazis to march in uniform, display the swastika, or distribute materials that would incite 
religious hatred. The Supreme Court ordered the state appellate courts either to allow an 
expedited appeal or to stay the injunction. National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 
(1977). The Illinois Appellate Court then modified the injunction to forbid only display of 
the swastika. Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 
347 (1977). After some more wrangling about a stay (see National Socialist Party v. Skokie, 
